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Abstract
This essay offers a reaction to the recent resurgence of presentism in the philosophy of time.
What is of particular interest in this renaissance is that a number of recent arguments supporting
presentism are crafted in an untypically naturalistic vein, breathing new life into a metaphysics
of time with a bad track record of co-habitation with modern physics. Against this trend, the
present essay argues that the pressure on presentism exerted by special relativity and its core
lesson of Lorentz symmetry cannot easily be shirked. A categorization of presentist responses
to this pressure is offered. As a case in point, I analyze a recent argument by Monton (2006)
presenting a case for the compatibility of presentism with quantum gravity. Monton claims that
this compatibility arises because there are quantum theories of gravity that use fixed foliations
of spacetime and that such fixed foliations provide a natural home for a metaphysically robust
notion of the present. A careful analysis leaves Monton’s argument wanting. In sum, the
prospects of presentism to be alleviated from the stress applied by fundamental physics are
faint.
1 Introduction
Presentism is the position in the philosophy of time that maintains that nothing exists that is not
present. In other words, only present events and objects exist, but no past or future events or
objects do. Furthermore, it usually assumes that there is a succession of presents, i.e. a moving
Now. Although logically independent from the thesis that defines the position, most presentists
thus take change, or becoming, to be a fundamental aspect of reality. Bradley Monton (2006, 264)
has appropriately dubbed the package of presentism-cum-becoming “Heraclitean presentism”. In
logical space, as he rightly notes, there could also be a presentist metaphysics which holds that
the spatially extended sum total of existence is completely static in that fundamentally, it does
not involve change at all. Such a “Parmenidean” version of presentism, however, has rarely, if
ever, been entertained.1 What is of relevance to my present purposes is simply the core thesis of
presentism according to which only present events and objects exist, and not whether this core is
adorned with Heraclitean or Parmenidean plumes.2
1Barbour (1999) can be read as offering a Parmenidean presentist view. Of course, there is lots more logical space
available, e.g. containing a presentist position which subscribes to a moving Now without there being any change
whatever. Furthermore, the basic presentist claim can be read as obtaining by necessity or merely contingently, which
opens logical space for necessitarian and Humean brands of presentism. All these further varieties and distinctions,
however, do not affect the present argument. I shall thus ignore them here.
2I understand that there is real worry about whether the debate between presentism and eternalism is well-formed
and metaphysically substantive, cf. Callender (2000), Dorato (2006), and Savitt (2006a). As I argue in an unpublished
essay, however, I believe that these worries can ultimately be dispelled. I wish to thank Steve Savitt for taking me
to task on this issue.
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There are a number of metaphysical objections against presentism in the literature, and they
shall not be surveyed here. Moreover, some authors have denied that it presents the only, or even
best, way to account for our intuitions about the phenomenology of temporality—traditionally
considered the strong suit of presentism. But a much more powerful, and potentially devastating,
challenge arises from modern physics: Einstein’s special relativity (SR) provides strong, and perhaps
conclusive, reason to view space and time not as two separable and quite distinct animals, but much
rather as entangled aspects of the same underlying four-dimensional manifold that fuses the two
into a “spacetime”. It was Hermann Minkowski’s great achievement to recognize the inseparability
of space and time resulting from Einstein’s theory when he solemnly declared at the Assembly of
German Natural Scientists and Physicians in Cologne in September 1908: “The views of space and
time which I wish to lay before you have sprung from the soil of experimental physics, and therein
lies their strength. They are radical. Henceforth space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed
to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent
reality.” Minkowski was also the first to correctly describe the geometrical properties of this fused
“space-time” structure that today we call Minkowski spacetime. Section 2 explicates how SR and its
attendant Minkowski spacetime exert significant pressure on presentist positions and thus revisits
the issue of compatibility of SR and presentism.
Although SR does not apodictically rule out presentism, it constrains it in a way that renders
whatever presentism survives the relativistic revolution a metaphysically rather unattractive crip-
ple. One might have expected that this would do it. But presentism dies hard, very hard. In fact,
after a period of relative tranquility, it enjoys something of a renaissance in the philosophy of time.
What is striking about this renaissance is that many of the hold-out (or born-again) presentists
attempt to support their position by arguments of the kind that have traditionally been the weapon
of choice for many of their opponents: arguments drawing on results from the physical sciences.
Section 3 analyzes in some detail a particularly interesting case recently offered by Monton (op. cit.).
His proposal is important in that it promises to breathe new, scientifically sophisticated life into
the otherwise moribund idea of presentism. Section 4 then investigates the prospects of presentism
in the so-called constant-mean-curvature (CMC) foliation approach to quantizing gravity, which
Monton finds particularly amenable to his presentist inclinations. It will illustrate the many ways
in which the CMC approach fails to vindicate presentism, despite its initial allure to the presentist.
SR, while strictly speaking false of the actual world, at least in an unqualified sense, imposes an
important constraint on feasible physical theories, or at least on all physically acceptable interac-
tions. In this sense, it can also be considered a “second-order theory”. This section, it should be
warned, will be somewhat technical due to the nature of the material covered in it. Finally, Section
5 offers some conclusions.
2 Minkowski spacetime and the pressure from special relativity
The eternalist considers the four-dimensional “block universe” with all of spacetime and everything
it contains to make up the sum total of existence. By contrast, the presentist maintains that the
sum total of existence can be understood as consisting of a three-dimensional manifold of spatially
distinct but temporally equally present, and thus simultaneous, events or objects. Presentism
thus seems to require an objective “foliation” of Minkowski’s spacetime into hyperspaces of three-
dimensional “space” ordered by a one-dimensional “time” parameter.3 In that it claims a different
3A foliation slices up the four-dimensional spacetime into space and time via an equivalence relation interpreted
as “simultaneity”. A binary relation Rxy is an equivalence relation on a set S iff it is reflexive (for all x ∈ S,Rxx),
symmetrical (for all x, y ∈ S, if Rxy, then Ryx), and transitive (for all x, y, z ∈ S, if Rxy and Ryz, then Rxz). Space
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ontological status for those things present from those non-present, it (usually) presupposes that
the distinction between the present and the non-present can be drawn in a principled, objective
way. In other words, it requires a metaphysically robust, objectively valid concept of a spatially
extended present.4 Alas, SR provides a strong reason to believe that that can’t be had.5
In pre-relativistic physics, the notion of simultaneity of spatially distant events was unproblem-
atic. In SR, however, it turned out that the requisite four-dimensional spacetime had a radically
different structure: whether or not two spatially distant events are simultaneous was no longer an
objectively and universally determinable fact of the matter. Two inertial observers at some relative
velocity with respect to one another do not agree whether two events are simultaneous or not. The
relation of simultaneity is thus relativized to reference frames. In a technical language, this means
that there is no preferred foliation of spacetime into slices of three-dimensional spaces representing
classes of simultaneous events. If we define “the present” as consisting of all those events which
occur simultaneous with the point in spacetime representing the here and now, then the relativity
of simultaneity seems to imply that the presentist is committed to relativize existence analogously:
if we are two inertial observers moving at some relative speed, we take different distant events to
be real!
Let’s back up a little and have a closer look at how (classical and relativistic) physics conceives
of time. Classical Newtonian mechanics does not postulate a Now, but is blatantly compatible with
a metaphysically robust and objectively valid concept of a spatially extended present. In fact, a
(non-relativistic) time-reparametrization-invariant theory, i.e. a theory in which the action remains
invariant under redefinitions of time t′ = f(t), generally allows for the possibility of an objective
spatially extended present, and even for temporal flux or becoming. In such a theory, two situations
differing only in their parametrizations of time are really descriptions of one and the same physical
situation. Consequently, time does not exist as an objectively measurable independent degree of
freedom; more precisely, time is not a magnitude with an objectively privileged metric. In a theory
like this, however, there exists an objective total ordering of events in time.6
Special-relativistic theories admit only a partial temporal ordering of events. The loss of absolute
simultaneity leads to a loss of comparability: with an interpretation of the binary ordering relation
as “being earlier than or simultaneous to”—it is a temporal ordering that we are seeking after all—,
pairs of spacelike related events do not stand in this relation. There is simply no frame-independent
fact of the matter as to whether event a is earlier than event b or the other way around for two
spacelike related events a and b. In general-relativistic theories, where the topology of a spacetime
may fail to even permit a non-unique foliation of spacetime into space and time, the possibility of
at a time is then given by the corresponding three-dimensional “folium” and time is the one-dimensional linearly
ordered quotient set induced by the equivalence relation, “lining up” the moments of simultaneity.
4At least standardly; Harrington (2008) has defended a “point present”, a radically solipsistic version of presentism
according to which not only only temporally present events exist, but also only spatially present ones. For the point
presentist, not even all of my present brain exists. Harrington’s position evades the objection raised in this section—
but at what price!
5While this paper focuses on presentism, a possibilist metaphysics defending a growing block or branching tree
structure faces analogous challenges from SR. For instance, McCall (2000) maintains the reality of the past and the
present, with the future as a branching set of four-dimensional alternatives. The “present” is the first branch surface,
which is defined as a maximal set of pairwise spatially separated events. In order to uphold Lorentz invariance, the
branch attrition along these surfaces is relativized to inertial frames. In this sense, McCall’s view is the possibilist
analogue of Fine’s presentism, presented below.
6A total order on a set S is given by a binary relation R that is reflexive (Raa for all a in S), weakly antisymmetrical
(for all a, b ∈ S,Rab and Rba entails a = b), transitive (for all a, b, c ∈ S,Rab and Rbc entails Rac), and comparable
(for any a, b ∈ S, either Rab or Rba). A partial order on a set is a binary relation with the first three properties, but
not the last one. Thus, in a partially ordered set, there exist pairs of elements in the set which do not exemplify the
relation.
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causal loops entails that the temporal ordering is in general not even weakly asymmetric, i.e. there
no longer is a partial temporal order of events. In fact, there is no global time deserving this title in
general relativity (GR), a fact that finds a particularly vivid expression in the so-called “problem
of time” arising in the Hamiltonian formulation of GR. Sic transit gloria temporis.
Let’s see what all of this implies for the prospects of presentism. Suppose one upholds the
following basic commitments:
Naturalism: Our metaphysical positions must be compatible with physics, at least to the extent
to which the latter is taken to be true of the world.
SR-Realism: Special relativity (SR) is taken to be (approximately) true of the world.
Presentism: There exists an objective spatially extended present and only events or objects in
this present exist.
Of course, Presentism implicitly asserts that it is a coherent, non-trivial, substantive metaphysical
position. Naturalism and SR-Realism jointly imply
Compatibilism: Whatever metaphysical view of the world we advance must be compatible with
the fact that SR is (approximately) true.
My purpose here is not to defend any of these theses but only to ask whether a commitment to
Compatibilism is consistent with maintaining Presentism. It is, as we shall see. The question,
however, is whether Compatibilism leaves the presentist with an interesting position at all. The
lesson gleaned from an argument independently advanced by Wim Rietdijk (1966) and Hilary
Putnam (1967) suggests that it does not. Since their argument is well known, let me only briefly
remind the reader how it essentially goes.7
The Rietdijk-Putnam argument assumes that the task is to figure out which of the spatially
distant events in the four-dimensional spacetime are co-present with the here-now. To identify the
objective, spatially extended present strikes me as an unavoidable task if presentism is characterized
as I did above. Next, introduce an equivalence relation R interpreted as “being simultaneous
with”. Then, use R to construct the spatially extended present, starting out from the here-now.
The problem essentially is, as mentioned above, that in SR simultaneity relations become frame-
relative. This was the content of the relativity of simultaneity. If in Figure 1, e designates the
here-now, then the event denoted by a is simultaneous to e as far as the primed frame is concerned,
but in the future of e according to the unprimed frame. In other words, in the primed frame, Rae,
but in the unprimed frame, ¬Rae. Thus, there is no objective fact of the matter which spatially
distant events are co-present with the here-now. It gets worse. Since simultaneity is a transitive
relation, one would expect that what is co-present with a spatially distant event co-present with
the here-now is also co-present with the here-now. Consider the situation as shown in Figure 2. In
the unprimed frame, e′ is certainly simultaneous with e and because e represents the here-now, e′
is also present (and thus exists). However, in the primed frame b is certainly simultaneous with e′
and because e′ is present, b is also present (and thus exists). Moving from one frame of reference
to another in the course of the argument ought to be acceptable if simultaneity were objective,
i.e. frame-independent. Of course in SR, it isn’t. But that’s the point. Consequently, a presentist
is committed to the existence of event b which is in the future of e with respect to all frames of
reference. But this is surely a reductio of the position.
Presentists have responded in a variety of ways to the pressure exerted by the Rietdijk-Putnam
argument and I shall not list them in any detail, but just highlight the basic strategic options. Here
7For a more basic and detailed rendering, see Savitt (2006b).
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Figure 1: The Rietdijk-Putnam argument illustrated.
are some incompatibilist strategies, i.e. responses rejecting Compatibilism in one form or other.
First, a presentist could deny Naturalism. Such denial could take different forms. One could, as
does Jonathan Lowe,8 claim that SR is not a theory about time but about something else instead.
Alternatively, one could retort by accepting that SR speaks to the geometry of spacetime but reject
that this has any ontological import, as does Dean Zimmerman (2008).9 Second, a presentist might
reject SR-Realism, simply asserting that SR is not approximately true of the world. This could
occur simply on a priori grounds, an option I will not comment on. In fact, the remainder of this
essay after this section will be dedicated to explore a posteriori exit strategies denying SR-Realism.
Relevantly, Monton (op. cit.) can be read as a representative of this strategy, as will become clear
below. Also, considerations from quantum mechanics can be invoked in an attempt to establish
that SR is false or incomplete insofar as it lacks an absolute, privileged frame of reference. This
response comes in different flavours: (a) (non-relativistic) collapse dynamics require a preferred
frame in which the collapse occurs; (b) Bohmian interpretations are incompatible with SR; and
(c) invoke Bell’s theorem to argue that some tenets of SR must be given up. I concur with Craig
Callender (2008) that these strategies don’t succeed, but will not elaborate here.
What are the basic compatibilist responses at the presentist’s disposal? First, the set-up of
the Rietdijk-Putnam argument could be rejected as doing violence to a genuinely presentist meta-
physics. What is more or less tacitly presupposed in the argument, it could be insisted, viz. that
there is a four-dimensional manifold of spacetime events such as Minkowski spacetime of which it
8In a paper entitled “Experience of change and change of experience”, delivered at the University of Geneva on
19 December 2008.
9Zimmerman, together with a number of present-day presentists, is hard to classify as either compatibilist or
incompatibilist as he accepts SR, but not in the role a naturalist usually would. He thinks that SR leaves room for
an additional relation of simultaneity not to be found in physics. This relation would only clash with physics if the
latter were committed to a principle prohibiting extra relations of this sort, but such a principle, he thinks, would
not be warranted. Of course, this relation would still effectively foliate spacetime. Such a foliation could either be
observed, or it couldn’t. If the former, Compatibilism would be denied; if the latter, we run into similar problems
as the defense championed by Tooley and Craig, which is essentially of that type and shall be discussed below. I
thank Jonathan Cohen for having reminded me of this connection.
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Figure 2: An event to the future of the here-now (in any frame) is co-present with it.
is then our task to determine which of these events are “determinate” as of the here-now or are
objectively present, ought to be discarded by the presentist. While I think that it is still a perfectly
justifiable task to ask of the presentist to describe the sum total of existence, to somehow tell a story
as to how her position can be reconciled with SR, the Rietdijk-Putnam argument certainly still has
force against an ersatzist version of presentism, which, as I have argued elsewhere (unpublished),
we are forced into in order to save presentism from the threat of trivialization. On the other hand,
a presentist might simply bite the bullet and consequently relativize existence, an option chosen by
Kit Fine (2005; particularly §10, pp. 298-307): since what is present is relative to an inertial frame,
what exists becomes fragmented in that it depends on the choice of frame. There is an interme-
diate strategy, somewhere between accepting the full consequences of the argument and rejecting
the way it sets up the presentist commitments: define the objectively existing present purely in
terms of the Lorentz-invariant structure available in Minkowski spacetime. The solipsistic version
mentioned earlier (in footnote 4) and defended by James Harrington (2008) trivially makes only use
of the Lorentz-invariant structure, viz. a single spacetime point as representing the spatiotemporal
location of the sum total of existence. But does this capture the true spirit of presentism? It can
be doubted, as neither existence nor “becoming” remain universal on this proposal. Fine (2005,
304) puts it succinctly: presentists tend to be impressed by the distinction between space and
time which they take to be metaphysically deep in that they think that there exists an objective
“now”, although there does not exist an equally objective “here”. Of course, this intuition is lost
in solipsistic presentism. Accordingly, it violates Presentism as I defined it above.
An alternative way of make exclusive use of the Lorentz-invariant structure has been proposed
by Howard Stein (1991) and could be termed past-light cone presentism. The main idea is to identify
the spatially extended present as the set of events on the past light cone of the here-now. Yes, you
haven’t misread: the idea is to define the present as the set of events on the past light cone. This
proposal is Lorentz-invariant and can be motivated by an appreciation of epistemic accessibility, as
causal signals reaching us now emanate from the events on the past light cone and thus appear to
us as being co-present. While on the solipsistic version, the simultaneity relation remains, trivially,
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an equivalence relation, it is no longer symmetrical and transitive in past-light cone presentism.
Symmetry, but not transitivity, can be restored by extending existence to events on the future light
cone. But in what sense would this still be the present? Points on Andromeda some four million
years apart in time, but at no distance in space according to some joint frame of reference for a
generic observer on earth and one on Andromeda, would both be co-present with the here-now.
A final compatibilist strategy that ought to be mentioned is to accept that SR offers a perfectly
empirically adequate theory, but to insist that absolute simultaneity still exists. It is just that we
cannot possibly detect the privileged frame of reference which determines the present. In other
words, absolute simultaneity is not empirically accessible. This strategy is, arguably, compatibilist
only in letter, but not in spirit. Its motivations may be metaphysical or physical. A variant of
the former is found in Michael Tooley (1997), one of the latter in neo-Lorentzian interpretations
of SR, such as the one attempted by William Craig (2001).10 In both cases, the metaphysics fully
relies on postulated extra-structure that can’t even in principle be observed. The extra-structure
needed is not motivated by more than specific metaphysical agendas or a refusnik attitude toward
SR. It violates Ockham’s razor so crassly that the move cannot be justified by putting some post-
verificationist philosophy of science on one’s flag. An argument to the effect that since it is only
because of some ill-advised verificationist commitment that SR prohibits a privileged frame, and
since we know that verificationism is false, we can infer that there is absolute simultaneity, does
obviously not succeed. But note that even if we permitted the stipulation of this unobservable
extra-structure, such as a simultaneity relation, it appears that it cannot do the work asked of it.
If one’s goal is to produce a metaphysics that vindicates our pre-theoretical (non-)ascriptions of
simultaneity, then a postulated simultaneity relation will not help such vindication so long as it is
epistemically inaccessible. And if it is epistemically accessible, Compatibilism is violated even in
letter.
In sum, the prospects of compatibilist strategies appear bleak. Those of incompatibilist re-
sponses hardly seem brighter, at least not for those of us who accept Naturalism—except if we
came to offer a strong a posteriori argument as to why SR does not approximately hold of the actual
world. There is plenty of physics that such an argument could turn on. It could be that Lorentz
symmetry only holds approximately and at large scales, e.g. if the underlying spacetime structure
is discrete. Depending on how approximately it would hold, this may still lead to a compatibilist
strategy. It could be that if gravity is turned on, or if we take quantum effects into considerations,
or both, it will be seen that SR is invalid. To discuss, or even list, all the physics that such an
argument could make use of is the task for another day. It is an interesting task that will lead
the investigator into a thick, and almost impenetrable, forest of foundational issues in fundamental
physics. Today, I will confine myself to an analysis of the suggestion in this vein recently made by
Monton (op. cit.).
3 Monton’s incompatibilist defence of presentism
Monton sums up the Rietdijk-Putnam argument as follows (op. cit., 264):
(1) “Presentism is incompatible with [special] relativity [...]”
(2) SR “is our most fundamental theory of physics.”
(3) “Presentism is incompatible with our most fundamental theory of physics (from (1) and (2)).”
10Craig also seems to think that SR is a kinematic theory that only underwrites electrodynamics, and not all or even
most of physics. This is simply false. Physicists are working hard to make sure that all theories are Lorentz-invariant.
If they fail in doing so, it is generally accepted that their theory faces a major problem.
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(4) “Presentism is false (from (3)).”
While Monton recognizes that the step from (3) to (4) is non-trivial, he finds it preferable if the
presentist wouldn’t have to rely on blocking that step. In other words, at least for the sake of
the present argument, he accepts Naturalism. Consequently, rejecting the argument will require
denying either one of the first two premises or the inference from them to (3). But this inference is
obviously valid. Offering an incompatibilist stance, Monton accepts premise (1). Remains premise
(2): Monton finds it “relatively uncontroversial” that thesis (2) is false, i.e. that SR is not our most
fundamental theory of physics. There is certainly a sense in which he is right: once gravity is taken
into account, SR must be replaced by GR which is arguably more fundamental; GR is incompatible
with quantum physics and both must be superceded by a quantum theory of gravity, which in
turn may ultimately be supplanted by a “theory of everything”. Thus, (2) is false. Of course, (3)
could still be true, viz. exactly in those cases where it turns out that the final fundamental theory
of physics is still incompatible with presentism, perhaps for reasons unrelated to the relativity of
simultaneity. But, injects Monton, there are quantum theories of gravity which are compatible
with presentism. What he has in mind here are approaches in so-called fixed-foliation quantum
gravity (QG), such as QG relying on foliations of spacetime into hypersurfaces of constant mean
(extrinsic) curvature or “CMC” for short. From the existence of such theories in QG, he infers that
“(3) is false, and presentism is unrefuted” (ibid., 265). This inference is of course only valid if it
is the case that one of those quantum theories of gravity compatible with presentism is in fact the
most fundamental theory of physics. I will overlook, at least for now, this overly excited inferential
step, but we will have to revisit it.
Monton’s argument can be thought of as consisting of two steps: first, SR is marginalized as an
irrelevant, and false, theory; second, the CMC approach to QG is then presented to add credence
to the claim that fundamental physics is hospitable to presentism. The remainder of this section
discusses the first part of the argument, the next section analyzes the second part.
Let me give three preliminary comments. First, I find it rather curious that Monton formulates
the argument in terms of which theories are fundamental. Whether or not a theory—any theory—
with which presentism’s compatibility is tested is fundamental or not seems entirely beside the
point. What matters is truth. Incompatibility with a theory which is true of the actual world
seems a sufficient condition to rule out a metaphysical proposal. Presumably, fundamentality entails
truth; no theory could reasonably be considered fundamental if it were not true. But of course
fundamentality is not necessary for truth. There are many theories about higher-level phenomena,
and presumably some of them are true without being fundamental. But that’s the crux: by denying
that SR is fundamental, Monton means to imply that it is false. Since incompatibility with a false
theory is not problematic, presentism would be saved. In general, however, non-fundamentality
does not entail falsehood. The situation at stake is more subtle, as it turns out. Strictly speaking,
and if no qualifications about its domain of applicability are added, SR is a false theory: it is not
in toto true of the actual world. However, it is still believed to impose a very rigid constraint on
any candidate fundamental theory. Just exactly what this constraint is will ultimately be decisive
in adjudicating whether presentism is compatible with the best physical theories true of our actual
world. I will return to this below.
In a sense, it’s even worse than this. Arguably, fundamentality imposes a partial ordering on
theories. But this means that there may fail to be a fact of the matter as to which one of two
particular theories is more fundamental. Furthermore, fundamentality may not be well-defined or
philosophically justifiable as an important, or relevant, criterion. Thus, fundamentality appears to
be a requirement which may be inapplicable in, as well as irrelevant to, the case at hand.
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Second, let me illustrate the dialectical landscape as I see it. We have seen above that Monton’s
argument can only offer respite for presentism if it cannot only claim that SR is not a fundamental
theory, but if it can also be made credible that presentism has good chances of being compatible
with our most fundamental theory of physics, and that (3) is thus false. But in order to establish
that, Monton must navigate between the Scylla of triviality and the Charybdis of falsehood. On
the one hand, his argument could be interpreted as primarily expressing general scepticism about
the current state of physics. Since we don’t have the physics in the ideal limit of scientific enquiry,
would be the thought, a presentist can maintain hope that she will ultimately be vindicated. But
such a hope would be pious indeed. Thus, if the intended conclusion is simply that in principle
it could be that presentism will eventually be compatible with fundamental physics, then it is
disappointingly trivial.
On the other hand, Monton’s argument may be read as offering a crystal ball from which the
future of QG can be gleaned. Here, the idea would be to reach a prediction that, at least with
reasonable probability, the final theory will be hospitable to presentism. But such a prediction
would be audacious indeed. In fact, if the claim is that it is reasonably likely that presentism will
eventually be compatible with fundamental physics, then the argument is unacceptably false.
It might be protested that I am striking Monton with an unfair dilemma. I am not: I don’t
claim that his conlusions are either trivial or false. What I am saying, however, is that he must
strike a fine balance in order to end up with a substantive and true conclusion. What I will attempt
to show in much of the remainder of this essay is that the room to manoeuvre between said Scylla
and Charybdis is uncomfortably tight.
Third, Monton treats the classical and the corresponding quantum version of a theory curiously
disanalogous. Such a disparity may sometimes be justified, but arguably not here. Let me explain.
Monton seems to think that choosing a particular (CMC) foliation is inadmissible at the classical
level, but entirely unproblematic once we go to the quantum theory. He asserts that presentism
is incompatible with SR and GR because Minkowski and general-relativistic “spacetimes do not
have a foliation into spacelike hypersurfaces as part of their structure.” (ibid., 267) Such foliation,
he admits, can sometimes be picked out, but “the foliation is not part of the spacetime structure
as given, and thus imposing such a foliation amounts to changing the theory.” (ibid., 268) It is
somewhat mysterious why he has such qualms about changing the theory, particularly since at the
end of his essay, he has no hesitation to proclaim that a committed presentist ought to demand
that since string theory and loop quantum gravity do not account for presentist intuitions, they
ought to be modified accordingly. Furthermore, as will become clear in Section 4, almost all of the
work on the CMC approach has been done at the classical, not at the quantum, level. For canonical
approaches, the classical and the quantum levels are not interpretationally independent: canonical
quantization necessitates an interpretation of the classical theory to be quantized which will then
be carried over into the corresponding quantum theory. Thus, for the fixed-foliation approach to
QG that Monton advocates, a CMC interpretation of the classical theory is presupposed and the
disparity assumed by Monton seems ill-justified.
Leaving the preliminaries, Monton starts out stating this argumentative goal:
[Because special and general relativity are not our most fundamental theories of physics],
the compatibility of presentism with special and general relativity is prima facie irrele-
vant to the issue of presentism5. I will argue that this prima facie appearance is in fact
correct. (ibid., 267)
Footnote 5 takes no prisoners: against Mark Hinchliff who asserted that SR is “one of our best-
confirmed scientific theories of the nature of time” (1996, 131), Monton declares that
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[t]his claim is false: the special theory is a decisively refuted theory of the nature of time.
Special relativity is incompatible with such phenomena as the gravitational redshift and
gravitational lensing, phenomena that provide evidence for general relativity. (ibid.)
As Monton acknowledges, scientists do not reject all old ideas in a scientific revolution. Thus,
one might require that the incompatibility of presentism with SR be carried over to any legiti-
mate candidate fundamental theory. However, he quickly dismisses this answer on the basis that
since there are many potentially viable approaches to QG, some of which frustrate the demanded
incompatibility, there are no compelling grounds on which a presentist must concede an eventual
incompatibility.
Because of the lack of data to back up the claim that a good theory is incompatible
with presentism,
Monton concludes that
all the literature on the issue of whether presentism is compatible with [...] relativity is
[...] irrelevant to the issue of whether presentism is true. (ibid., 269)
While it is certainly true that there is no empirical data directly suggesting an incompatibil-
ity with presentism, this conclusion can’t be had that easily. The Principle of Relativity, i.e. the
demand that the physics is the same in all inertial frames, is encoded in a theory as the Lorentz
covariance of its dynamical equations, which means that there can’t be any dynamical phenomena
that would allow us to pick a privileged frame and thus an absolute simultaneity. In SR, this dynam-
ical symmetry is carried over into the spacetime structure, leading to the geometry of Minkowski
spacetime, which of course is invariant under Lorentz transformations. In GR, the Principle of
Equivalence ascertains that at each point of spacetime, the spacetime structure exhibits the same
symmetry. Quantum field theory (QFT) assumes the Minkowski spacetime as Lorentz-invariant
background structure, and QFT on curved spacetime makes the same symmetry assumption for
each point of the (curved) spacetime background. In fact, most physicists would agree that dy-
namical equations ought to be Lorentz-covariant and that the background spacetime at least of
semi-classical theories must have the relevant symmetry at least in some local sense.
The fixed-foliation quantum theories of gravity to be discussed in the next section violate the
Principle of Relativity in that they require a preferred frame of reference.11 There is to date,
of course, no empirical indication whatsoever that such a preferred frame of reference exists. In
fact, Lorentz (or, more precisely, Poincare´) symmetry is fantastically well confirmed.12 Thus, to
require that Lorentz symmetry be valid is well justified. Now, this in itself does not entail an
incompatibility of presentism with empirical data. As we have seen in Section 2, there are perfectly
Lorentz-invariant ways of formulating a presentist position, although there is considerable doubt
whether they succeed in fully capturing the spirit of presentism. Be this as it may, the fact that
Lorentz symmetry is so well confirmed puts serious pressure on any approach that requires a
preferred reference frame.13
11Monton agrees: “the proponent of fixed foliation quantum gravity will agree that there is a preferred frame of
reference, and can admit that [...] the theory makes sense only in one reference frame.” (ibid., 271)
12For an authoritative review of experimental tests of Lorentz symmetry, cf. Will (2005a, b); for a recent review
on phenomenological indications that Lorentz symmetry may be broken at the Planck scale, cf. Amelino-Camelia
(2008).
13Monton addresses remarks by Gordon Belot and John Earman (2001) that could be framed as an objection to
his view. They argue that fixed-foliation approaches to QG have few adherents because “[t]o forsake the conventional
reading of general covariance as ruling out the existence of preferred co-ordinate systems is to abandon one of the
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Let me frame this in more general terms. SR can be thought of as a “first-order theory”, i.e. a
theory which makes claims about the world and as such can be true or false of the actual world.
As it completely ignores gravity, a strong case can be made that it is, in fact, false. However, it
might also be regarded as a “second-order theory”, i.e. a theory that places certain constraints on
other theories. More specifically, it requires that all possible physical interactions be governed by
Lorentz-covariant dynamics. Second-order theories that provide constraints in the form of necessary
conditions may be considered true if they correctly rule out false first-order theories and false in
that they incorrectly rule out true first-order theories.
In sum, I submit that Monton is grossly underestimating the argumentative work that would
be necessary to brush SR to the side. Thus, he has failed, in my view, to sufficiently establish the
first part of his argument, viz. to marginalize SR as an irrelevant and false theory. It turns out that
in exactly those aspects which are relevant to a presentist, SR is too pertinacious to be so easily
blown away by the simple need of a quantum theory of gravity. Let us turn to the second step of
the argument.
4 The CMC foliation approach: a new home for presentism?
The constant mean curvature (CMC) foliation approach is a fixed-foliation theory as discussed in
the previous section.14 In fact—and this ends up undermining Monton’s case—, it is not really an
approach to QG in its own right, but merely a technique that is explored on the road to QG. It starts
out, like other canonical approaches to gravity, from a formulation of GR as a Hamiltonian system
with constraints, dealing with spacetimes of topology Σ× R—in itself a limitation. The canonical
variables are the 3-metric induced on the spacelike hypersurface Σ, which describes the geometry of
Σ, and its extrinsic curvature, which specifies the embedding of Σ in the four-dimensional manifold.
The content of Einstein’s field equations—the dynamical equations of the standard formulation
of GR—is re-expressed in the constraint equations. These constraints define a subspace of the
phase space Γ, the so-called constraint surface Γ¯. In the CMC approach, only the subset Γτ ⊂ Γ¯
defined by the condition that the mean (i.e., the trace) of the extrinsic curvature is constant is
considered. This mean (extrinsic) curvature is denoted by τ . A spacelike hypersurface Σ has
constant mean curvature just in case τ is constant across Σ. Why does this condition deserve
to be called a “time gauge”, indicating that the spacetime is foliated into sets of “simultaneous”
events? It just so turns out that a reasonably large open subset of the space of models of GR
consist of spacetimes admitting a unique foliation into hypersurfaces parametrized by constant
mean curvature. If a general-relativistic spacetime is sliceable into hypersurfaces of constant mean
curvature—call these spacetimes CMC-sliceable—, then τ varies monotonically within a constant
mean curvature foliation.
Starting out from the subset Γτ ⊂ Γ¯ of CMC-sliceable spacetimes, a particular foliation is
chosen for every model in that subset: the CMC foliation. This move significantly reduces the
central tenets of modern physics” (241). Monton disagrees vehemently: He flatly denies that fixed-foliation approaches
require a preferred coordinate system. He bases this denial on Kretschmann’s objection to general covariance as a
physically contentful constraint on theories. While it is perhaps true that fixed-foliation theories can all be formulated
in a generally covariant manner, the objection becomes impotent if general covariance is interpreted in the correct,
substantive way, i.e. as a gauge symmetry of GR. Although the particular formulation chosen by Belot and Earman
may be unfortunate, their point essentially stands: fixed-foliation theories break the symmetry for which we have
excellent reason to believe that every viable theory must respect it.
14This section is inevitably more technical than the rest of this essay, although an effort is made to provide a self-
contained characterization of the approach. For more extensive and rigorous presentations of the approach, consult
Beig (1994, 74-77), Fischer and Moncrief (1997), Isenberg (1995), and Rendall (1996). Cf. also Belot and Earman
(2001, particularly 239f).
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technical difficulty of solving the constraint equations in that it effectively eliminates three of
the four usual constraint equations, and three of the four functions to be solved for. Essentially,
reducing Γ¯ to Γτ amounts to fixing the gauge, hence “time gauge”. The only gauge freedom left
are reparametrizations of τ . Thus, general covariance is broken down to time-reparametrization
invariance, which effectively brings the situation back to a time-reparametrization-invariant theory
as characterized early in Section 2. Also, this step simplifies the remaining constraint equation to
an equation linear in the momentum conjugate to τ . Given a particular τ -parametrization then, one
can construct a Hamiltonian. The resulting time-dependent Hamiltonian H(τ) effectively measures
the spatial volume of the universe. More precisely, it provides a measure for the volume of the
Cauchy surface of mean extrinsic curvature τ . Thus, as Beig (1994, 77) concludes, by selecting a
distinguished parametrization, a time-dependent Hamiltonian system with the Hamiltonian given
by the volume function can be constructed to mimic a cousin of GR. Once the classical Hamiltonian
theory is in place, then, an attempt can be made at cooking it up into a quantum theory using
the canonical recipe. It turns out that a canonical quantization of such a Hamiltonian system can
successfully be completed for the (2 + 1)-dimensional cousin of GR, but not for the much more
pertinent (3 + 1)-dimensional case of full GR.
The CMC approach has additional serious limitations, both at the classical and the quantum
level. First, it is well-understood only for the vacuum case and for spatially closed spacetimes,
i.e. for spacetimes with manifolds such that Σ is compact and without boundary. There are good
reasons to believe that the actual universe exemplifies neither of these properties. Second, not
all globally hyperbolic, spatially closed vacuum spacetimes admit a foliation into hypersurfaces of
constant mean curvature.15 Apart from the limitations noted above, this means that the CMC
approach cannot deal with some general-relativistic spacetimes, even if we restrict those to be
globally hyperbolic. There is no consensus as to how severe the restriction to globally hyperbolic
spacetimes is. On the one hand, there are important classes of non-globally hyperbolic spacetimes.16
On the other hand, important approaches to QG such as loop quantum gravity are confined to the
same class of spacetimes. Also, the initial value problem can only meaningfully be addressed in
the context of globally hyperbolic spacetimes. I will leave this question aside and instead turn to
a brief discussion of the reach of the spacetimes amenable to a CMC-slicing.
Such a discussion starts out from the conformal reformulation of the standard constraint equa-
tions of Hamiltonian GR as proposed and developed by Andre´ Lichnerowicz and Yvonne Choquet-
Bruhat and James York (1980). The conformal method has proved to be a potent means to approach
the Cauchy problem and has important applications in numerical GR. The question that is being
asked is not which part of a given spacetime can be covered by a CMC foliation. Rather, the idea is
to simultaneously construct or recover a full four-dimensional spacetime as the solution of a Cauchy
problem as well as to obtain a CMC foliation of it, using the mean curvature τ to parametrize the
foliation and thus to provide a global time function. Naturally, this approach cannot hope to result
in anything other than globally hyperbolic spacetimes.
The approach starts out from initial data on a spacelike hypersurface Σ, the induced metric
λab on Σ and a symmetric tensor field σab, which is trace-free (λabσab = 0) and divergence-free
(λ∇aσab = 0 where λ∇ is the covariant derivative compatible with λab) with respect to λab. The
tensor field σab is the second fundamental form on Σ. Roughly, λ corresponds to the spatial
components of the metric and σ to their time derivatives. To these, the scalar field τ is added.
The triple (λab, σab, τ) on Σ, usually called the conformal data, then acts as initial data for the
Hamiltonian equivalent of Einstein’s field equations. This is to be understood in the sense that
15Cf. Bartnik (1988) and Rendall (1996).
16Cf. Smeenk and Wu¨thrich (forthcoming) for more on non-globally hyperbolic spacetimes.
12
the usual initial data for the standard Hamiltonian field decomposition into induced 3-metrics
and extrinsic curvature satisfy the standard constraint equations if and only if the conformal data
satisfy the corresponding conformal constraint equations. These equations, which I am not going
to reproduce here, constitute a coupled quasilinear elliptic system of partial differential equations
that do not afford a solution for all choices of conformal data (and hence not for the corresponding
standard situation). These equations pose formidable technical obstacles and do consequently
not surrender to general solution. The reason why the CMC approach is pursued is because,
as mentioned above, assuming that τ is constant—which is exactly what CMC does—offers a
significant technical simplification at this point: It eliminates three of the four conformal constraint
equations, as well as three of the four unknown functions to be solved for. The remaining constraint
equation, often termed Lichnerowicz equation, although still not solved in the general case, permits
the proving of theorems pertaining to the existence and uniqueness of solutions.
An important problem that arises in this context, the so-called Yamabe problem, is the issue of
conformally rescaling a metric to obtain a metric of constant scalar curvature. It turns out that
there is a solution to this problem for metrics on spatially compact manifolds. This is what the
following theorem establishes (Isenberg 1995, 2252):
Theorem 1 (Yamabe) Let λab be a C∞ Riemannian metric on a closed three-dimensional man-
ifold Σ. Then there exists a C∞ positive-definite function θ on Σ such that the scalar curvature of
the metric θ4λab is constant.
Yamabe’s Theorem can be shown to imply, together with some propositions that require little
extra work (ibid., 2253), that the set of all C∞ Riemannian metrics on Σ can be partitioned into
three Yamabe classes: Since each of these metrics will be conformal to a metric with constant
scalar curvature 1, 0 or −1, they fall exactly into one of the corresponding Yamabe classes denoted
Y+(Σ),Y0(Σ) or Y−(Σ), respectively. For each λab, its Yamabe class is thus a conformal invariant.
It turns out that for some closed manifolds Σ, Y+(Σ) and Y0(Σ) are both empty, while Y−(Σ) is
never empty. Furthermore, Y0(Σ) can only be empty if Y+(Σ) is also empty, but the converse is
not true.
James Isenberg (1995) systematically investigates for which sets of conformal data (λab, σab, τ)
the Lichnerowicz equation can be solved and thus be mapped to a solution of the standard constraint
equations, and for which sets it can’t. As he shows, the solvability depends on three criteria. First,
it depends on which Yamabe class λab belongs to. Second, it relies on whether σ2 = σabσab is
identically zero on Σ or not. Finally, it matters whether the constant τ is zero or not. These
criteria are all conformal invariants. Of the resulting twelve classes of conformal data, six map to
solutions of the Lichnerowicz equation and six don’t. More precisely, Isenberg (1995, 2259) shows
the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (Isenberg) Let λab be a (sufficiently smooth) Riemannian metric on Σ, σab a sym-
metric tensor field on Σ which is trace-free and divergence-free with respect to λab, and τ a constant.
Then the following table indicates for which conformal data (λab, σab, τ) the Lichnerowicz equation
does (“Yes”) or does not (“No”) admit a solution:
(σ2 ≡ 0, τ = 0) (σ2 ≡ 0, τ 6= 0) (σ2 6≡ 0, τ = 0) (σ2 6≡ 0, τ 6= 0)
λab ∈ Y+ No No Yes Yes
λab ∈ Y0 Yes No No Yes
λab ∈ Y− No Yes No Yes
For conformal data in the class (λab ∈ Y0, σ2 ≡ 0, τ = 0), the solution is non-unique; for all others
the solution is unique if it exists.
13
For any given closed three-manifold Σ, Isenberg’s Theorem offers a “complete function space
parametrization” (ibid.) of the set of CMC solutions of the standard constraints. In fact, the
set of CMC solutions of the standard constraints stand in a one-to-one correspondence with what
is essentially the direct sum of the six classes of conformal data as given in the table in Theorem 2
(ibid.).17
Before we press on to more pertinent matters, let me note the fact that for conformal data of the
class (λab ∈ Y0, σ2 ≡ 0, τ = 0) (i.e., in case the metric is conformal to another one with vanishing
scalar curvature everywhere on Σ, the square of the tensor field essentially giving its temporal
derivative is identically zero on Σ, and the constant mean extrinsic curvature vanishes on Σ), we
are confronted with a kind of indeterminism. Given conformal data of this category on Σ, there exist
multiple solutions to the dynamical equations. In other words, for this class of field values on Σ,
the initial state of the physical system does not, in tandem with the dynamical equations, uniquely
determine the state of the physical system for all times. The construction of the conformal method
does not yield a unique four-dimensional spacetime. It is appropriate to speak of indeterminism
since Σ can be considered a time slice on which the system’s state is specified by the conformal data.
From the fact that for a given folium with its constant mean curvature and initial data the dynamical
development, and thus the construction of the full spacetime, is sometimes non-unique, it does not
follow, as Earman (2008, 148) seems to suggest,18 that for a given four-dimensional spacetime, its
global foliation into hypersurfaces of constant mean curvature is sometimes non-unique, if it exists.
The reason for this is that the different solutions will not correspond to different foliations of the
same spacetime, but rather to different spacetimes altogether. Conversely, this in itself does not
imply that CMC-slicings will be unique for a given spacetime, where they exist.
Be this as it may, the main problem of the CMC approach is, already at the classical level,
that only a limited, although arguably important, class of spacetime models of GR comply in that
they are CMC-sliceable. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, this class does not even exhaust the
globally hyperbolic spacetimes of GR. Furthermore, also as stated above, it is only tractable for
spatially closed vacuum spacetimes. But there is an additional difficulty, as pointed out by Isham
(1991, 200): time-dependent Hamiltonians, as we find them here, have odd consequences. First,
they are typically interpreted to mean, at least at the quantum level, that energy can enter or leave
the quantum system, i.e., that the system is not closed. But this is odd indeed, as the system at
stake is supposed to be the entire universe. Second, as Isham continues, for systems with time-
dependent Hamiltonians one cannot get the Wheeler-DeWitt equation for the reduced system from
the relevant Schro¨dinger equation, which shows the inequivalence of different canonical approaches
to QG. This may not ultimately amount to a strike against the CMC approach, but its advocate
must find a way to accommodate this inequivalence.
One might dissent to using the CMC approach for presentist purposes with an analogue to
Kurt Go¨del’s (1949, 562) objection to James Jeans’s proposal to rest a robust notion of absolute
time on the cosmological time of highly symmetrical spacetimes whose foliation into space and
time sensitively depends on these symmetries. As Go¨del insisted, whether or not absolute time
existed should not depend on contingent matters of fact concerning the distribution of matter
and energy in the actual universe. Similarly, a potential resuscitation of presentism by the CMC
17“Essentially” because the space of conformal data must be quotiented out by the action of the group of conformal
transformations, as well as by the action of the spatial diffeomorphism group in order for the correspondence to be
one-to-one.
18When he writes that “[t]ypically such a foliation is unique when it exists, but existence is guaranteed only for
a limited class of solutions to Einstein’s field equations, a class that does not exhaust solutions with causally nice
features” (emphasis added). While I agree with every other part of the statement, I take issue with the first clause’s
suggestion that there may be cases where such foliation is not unique, for which I see no warrant in the literature.
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approach fails, the objection goes, on the grounds that the CMC foliation also depends on the same
kinds of contingent facts. In defense of the CMC-inspired presentist, it should be noted, however,
that the Go¨del move is significantly weaker here than it was in the original case. The reason for
this disanalogy is that CMC-sliceable spacetimes form, to repeat, open subsets in the space of
solutions—unlike the highly symmetrical spacetimes relied on by Jeans. It is true that moving
around the matter and energy content of the universe will in general deform the CMC foliation,
but this will often not change the fact that there is a CMC foliation for the spacetime at stake.
Let us, for the sake of Monton’s argument, ignore these limitations of the CMC approach and
ask whether it would, if borne out, vindicate presentism, as Monton asserts. No, it would not; or at
least not as easily as Monton seems to think. Apart from those limitations of the CMC approach
already listed, it is far from clear whether the CMC approach can be exploited to underwrite a
presentist metaphysics. In particular, it is far from obvious how the mean extrinsic curvature τ
relates to physical time, despite the fact that it can be used as a global time parameter. What
the presentist needs is an account of how τ gives raise to not just physical time, but a time that
underwrites our presentist intuitions. The fact that the folia are Cauchy surfaces might help the
presentist here, as this will permit to establish a direct connection to the initial value problem and
issues of determinism, which, if anything, seem to be directly linked to the role of physical time.19
In the absence of such an account, a presentist such as Monton may rightly claim that the CMC
approach, to the extent to which it is to be taken seriously as a fundamental, or at least true,
physical theory, relieves the pressure that presentism has felt since the advent of SR. He has not
yet, however, produced a positive argument in favour of presentism. For this, an account relating
the CMC approach to our allegedly presentist phenomenology is essential.
Finally, lest the presentist gets overly enamoured of the CMC approach, it ought to be noted
that no one takes it seriously as a physically plausible full theory of classical or quantum gravity.
The real interest in the approach is fueled by the fact that it so significantly simplifies the systems
of constraint equations that the Hamiltonian approach to GR is usually confronted with. Thus,
the sole reason the CMC ansatz is explored is because it offers a technically tractable toy theory
of canonical gravity.20 Overall, it is incapable of accommodating the full plethora of gravitational
phenomena that a theory of gravity is expected to address. Finally, as a reminder, the irony that
published work in the CMC approach has almost exclusively dealt with the classical level while
Monton was really concerned with a fundamental quantum theory of gravity should not be lost on
the reader.
5 Conclusion
Since there are no complete quantum theories of gravity available at present—let alone “theories
of everything”—, the question of whether presentism is ultimately compatible with fundamental
physics remains open. The most promising approaches to QG to date, string theory and loop
quantum gravity, offer no respite for presentism. As far as I understand it, string theory is a
fully Lorentz-invariant theory. Similarly, loop quantum gravity does not permit the introduction
of preferred frames of reference and thus does not contain the resources to support a privileged
foliation. As a matter of fact, there is a foreboding sense in which time evaporates completely
as a fundamental physical magnitude in loop quantum gravity. Presumably, such physics could
not underwrite Monton’s project of reading a presentist metaphysics of time into the fundamental
19Although the potential non-uniqueness of CMC foliations would surely undermine such a connection if borne out.
20Cf. also Belot and Earman (2001, 241).
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physics.21 Even on its own limited terms, I have argued that those approaches to QG that rely on
fixed-foliations such as the CMC proposal are not as hospitable to presentism as Monton seems to
think.
Let me conclude with Callender (2000) who warns against permitting presentism (or, more
generally, any tensed theory of time) to “push us away from the traditional understanding of
relativity” (S596), a role to be reserved for developments in physics. Monton shrugs this charge off
by explaining that no non-traditional interpretation of relativity is required, since the presentist can
simply deny that SR or GR are true theories just because they are incompatible with presentism.
One man’s modus ponens is truly another man’s modus tollens. But if a re-interpretation of
relativity against the backdrop of presentism is not warranted by evidence or argument, then the
whole-sale rejection of it will hardly be more acceptable! Monton seems to think that, at least
as viewed from a point of view of a committed presentist, since presentism is true, science should
not, for its own good, turn out to be incompatible with it. Since alternative approaches to QG
are incompatible with becoming, and since the existence of becoming is a philosophical, not a
scientific, issue for the presentist, “we should expect the correct theory of quantum gravity to be a
fixed foliation theory” (op. cit., 274). But that’s exactly the point: if we base the scientific decision
among competing theories on metaphysical predilections, we better have good reasons to do so. A
failure to appreciate this would mislead us into abandoning Naturalism, or anyway naturalism.22
In this vein, Callender continues by asking, quite pertinently in my view, “if science cannot
find the ‘becoming frame’, what extra-scientific reason is there for positing it?” (S597) Monton
(op. cit., 272) replies to this charge by insisting that he can’t discern a reason why the presentist
ought to be committed to the antecedent. The grounds for denying the antecedent of Callender’s
conditional statement, Monton believes, can be found in that the CMC foliation approach yields
what can be interpreted as the becoming frame. To be sure, we would need some sort of account
of how exactly the CMC foliation of a spacetime underwrites “becoming” for that move to be
successful. Monton recognizes that he cannot offer any positive account from our experiences to
the necessity of the becoming frame, or of how the becoming frame is coupled to a CMC foliation,
but he defends himself by retorting that “just because we do not have a good argument for the
presentist doctrine... does not mean that the doctrine is false” (ibid., 273n). True, but in the
absence of such argument, there is little or no reason to take the CMC foliation approach seriously
as a full-fledged physical theory potent enough to supplant GR. As we have seen, this approach
is highly limited in its applicability, remains almost exclusively at the classical level, and does not
offer a viable road to a resuscitation of presentism. More seriously still, if what I said above is true,
then we do have reason to accept the antecedent of Callender’s pronouncement.
If we accept the antecedent, however, then the presentist must give sound arguments that are
sufficiently forceful to overturn time-honoured Lorentz invariance as a constraint on a future theory
of QG. That does not seem to be forthcoming. On balance, I submit, the prospects of presentism
look rather dim.
21Monton (op. cit., 277) thinks that the presentist can evade the problem of time by simply maintaining that the
position does not speak to fundamental reality, but only to time. Thus, if time is emergent rather than fundamental,
presentism would be true as long as the emergent time fits the presentist metaphysics. While I acknowledge this
possibility, it doesn’t offer an appealing option to the presentist.
22Monton recognizes this possibility when he offers an alternative move: the presentist could decide to give up
scientific, but not metaphysical, realism.
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